Formal Opinions

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  • Honorable James F. Sullivan, Department of Transportation, 1998-009 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    This is in response to your letter dated June 2, 1998, in which you request our opinion regarding the scope of authority delegated to the State Traffic Commission ("Commission") to establish speed limits on multiple lane, limited access state highways. More specifically, you ask whether or not the Commission has the authority to establish a speed limit above fifty-five (55) miles per hour but less than the sixty-five (65) miles per hour maximum speed limit set forth in Conn. Public Acts No. 98-181, Sec. 1.

  • George F. Wandrak, Division of Special Revenue, 1998-001 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    You have asked for an opinion regarding the interpretation of certain provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), originally executed April 25, 1994, between the State of Connecticut and the Mohegan Tribe ("Tribe") which permits the Tribe to operate video facsimile games as long as the Tribe contributes to the State a percentage of the revenue generated from those games in accordance with the terms of the MOU. In particular, a dispute has arisen between the Division of Special Revenue ("Division") and the Tribe concerning how to calculate certain payments.

  • Dr. Henry C. Lee, Commissioner, Department of Public Safety, 1998-023 Formal Opinion, Attorney General of Connecticut

    In a memorandum dated October 5, 1998, your agency asked for our opinion regarding two questions that have arisen since the issuance of our September 28, 1998 opinion regarding Public Act 98-111. The first question asks the following: 1) A review of the opinion would seem to indicate that an individual convicted of, for example, C.G.S. Sec. 53a-71(a)(1), and sentenced to a term of probation commencing September 28, 1998 would not have to be registered under either Public Act 97-183 or Public Act. 98-111. Your second question is as follows: 2) Section 3(b) of the Act provides that any individual who has been subject to the registration requirements of Public Act 97-183 must register under Public Act 98-111 in the manner required for sexually violent offenders.